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A serious challenge facing American statesmen and citizens today is
to adopt means to defend free institutions and yet retain their freedom.
The challenge is not new. It presents the same issue which in differ-
ent form but similar content confronted our country on the eve of the
Civil War. Abraham Lincoln, in words prophetic of the present,
declared:'
"And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United
States. It presents to the whole family of man the question of
whether a constitutional republic, or democracy-a government of
the people by the same people-can or cannot maintain its terri-
torial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the ques-
tion whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to con-
trol administration according to organic law in any case, can
always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pre-
tenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their govern-
ment, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the
earth. It forces us to ask, Is there in all republics this inherent and
fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be too strong for
the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own ex-
istence?"
This fundamental question is raised anew today because of the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its avowed purpose to establish
the Soviet system throughout the world. Aware of that policy, the
United States is concerned with Moscow "direction and guidance" of
Communist activities within the United States.
Certain measures have been adopted by our Government in order
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to deal with these activities. One of these measures which has evoked
severe criticism is the President's so-called Loyalty Program.2 This
program represents a hastily improvised barrier against Communist
attempts to penetrate Government agencies. In the magazines, the
press and" on the radio, we find those who label it a reckless and hys-
terical campaign of suppression and violence.' It is charged that pub-
lic sentiment is analogous to past hysterias which produced the Alien
and Sedition Acts enacted in the Jefferson administration, appeared
during the period of the Populist Party in the 1890's, and created the
Red scare after World War I. The analogy is not quite accurate
either in circumstances or in consequences. Of course, there are in-
stances in our history when there was the cry "Wolf", "Wolf"-such
as those recited here. But even in the fable--one day the Wolf did
come.
Before this Loyalty Program can be measured and the validity of
the charges analyzed, it is essential first to have a clear understanding
of the concept of freedom in the name of which the pr6gram is both
defended and attacked; and second, to appraise the threats of Com-
munist action to national security.
While much has been said-pro and con-of the preservation of free-
dom involved in the Loyalty Program, little has been said of the basic
concept of freedom. Like all great words for which men are willing to
die, the word "freedom" conveys a number of meanings. These mean-
ings though widely different have something in common. Jacques
Maritain, the French theologian, finds two principal lines of signifi-
cance in this variety of meanings. 4
The one concerns freedom as an absence of necessity-freedom of
choice-an act of free will determined by no outer or inner necessity.
The other concerns freedom as an absence of constraint. It is in this
that we as average men are interested because it means personal in-
dependence. This kind of freedom, dearly bought, is constantly
threatened. When freedom from constraint is lost, the rights and
privileges of common man go with it. Man is safe only when free to
develop his potentialities subject to corresponding responsibility and
obligation.
The inseparability of responsibility and freedom-of duty and right
-has been recognized through the ages. The central problem of all
political philosophy and practice, as brought out by Carl Becker,5
2. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947).
3. See Emerson and Helfeld, Loyalty Among Govcrmnent Em1ployees, 58 YAL LJ.
1, 134 (1948) ; judge Thurman Arnold at the American Forum of the Air, July 4, 1949,
discussing the subject: "Is There Too Much Spy Hysteria?"; ANDREWS, W, TO1NX
WITCH HuNT (1948) ; Paul Porter, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1949, p. 20, col. 3.
4. MARITAIN, SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS 136-43 (1940).
5. BECxER, FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN WAY OF Lmr 3 (1949).
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". . . is not whether freedom and responsibility shall be united,
but how they can be united and reconciled to the best advantage.
. . . The essential question always difficult and sometimes impos-
sible to answer is: What action by what person or persons under
what specific circumstances does injure others or so far and so
persistently injure others that it needs to be restricted or for-
bidden?"
To John Stuart Mill the answer was clear. In his work, On Liberty,
regarded by many as the complete and best expression of the faith of a
liberal in the progress of mankind through freedom of thought, MIl
wrote: 6
"[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. . . . IT]he only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."
The resulting impotence of a government which is denied the right
to impose qualifications on such fundamental rights as free speech has
been emphasized by many authors. A recent example is the statement
of the English professor, A. D. Lindsay, who writes: 7
"But the doctrine that a democratic government must use as
little compulsion as is compatible with its remaining a govern-
ment at all is a perilous one because of its indecisiveness. . . . The
weak and irresolute government which this theory induces may de-
stroy a state as surely, if not as immediately, as thoroughgoing
anarchy. Indecisive woolliness is the curse of much modem dem-
ocratic thought."
This concept of freedom has formed the basis for the great consti-
tutional documents on which the modem democratic states have been
founded. A declaration of rights as well as of duties of the citizen was
expressly set forth by the French National Assembly in its constitu-
tion of 1793.8 The principle that "liberty consists in the power to do
whatever does not injure others," enunciated in the French Declara-
tion, has found expression in many of our State Constitutions.0 Though
our Federal Constitution contains no Bill of Responsibilities, it is
implicit in our Bill of Rights that every freedom which is conferred
carries with it corresponding obligations.
6. fni, Oa Libcrty, in UmTiLAR,ANism, Lmrmr AnD RUR~Es;mF_'rnT Gov-
EPNMIENT 72-3 (Everyman's Library, 1929).
7. 1 LINDSAY, THE MODERN DE OCATEIC STATE 262-3 (1943).
8. Draft Constitution, 1793, National Convention, Session June 23, 1795.
9. See, e.g., CoxN. CoNsT. Art. I, § 5; N.Y. Coxsr. Art. I, § 8; DrL. Co:-sm. Art. I,
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This dual aspect of our Bill of Rights has been recognized on many
occasions by our Supreme Court. In sustaining the constitutionality
of a state criminal syndicalism statute against charges that it violated
the right of free speech, the Court pointed out: 10
"That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitu-
tion does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibil-
ity, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled
license giving immunity for every possible use of language and pre-
venting the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that
a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who
abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare,
tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger
the foundations of organized government and threaten its over-
throw by unlawful means, is not open to question."
Few would dispute this concept of freedom. Few would urge that
the prevention of harm to others and the safety of the community can
never outweigh the individual's absolute right to act and to speak in all
circumstances and under all conditions." Nor would they deny to
their Government the right to take steps to protect its citizens against
those individuals who refuse to assume the duty of self-restraint in-
herent in the rights accorded to them by their Government.
In the light of this concept of freedom, the activities of the Com-
munist Party should be evaluated with a view to determining the
propriety of and necessity for self-protective measures on the part of
the Government.
In his book, The Red Decade, Eugene Lyons expresses the situation
in these words:
"iTlhere is a point at which self-confidence becomes foolish and
even suicidal. Such indulgence in a period of crisis when democ-
racy is admittedly on the defensive is worse than frivolous ...
"We cannot and must not deny to any American the right to
believe anything he wishes-and that includes socialism and com-
munism and anarchism in all their endless variations. But by no
stretch of common sense can this principle be distorted to provide
shelter for the agents of any totalitarian nation and to facilitate the
success of Hitler's or Stalin's assignments in America. It is not tol-
erance but stupidity to risk our democracy out of fear of sullying it.
We must make a clear and indubitable distinction between an
10. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ; see also United Public Workers
of America (CIO) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
11. Even in Terminiello v. Chicago, 69 S. Ct. 894 (1949), the majority opinion
recognized that free speech was not an absolute right. The different views expressed
by the various dissenting opinions in that case centered primarily around the question of
the type of situation which can properly give rise to curtailment of that right. The ra-
jority opinion would not seem even to have reached that question through concentration
on the nature of the judge's charge.
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American's personal beliefs, however unorthodox or cockeyed, and
automatic submission to dictation from outside. It is, in the final
checkup, the difference between an honest opinion and an order
from headquarters." 12
COIMUNISM: MENACE TO NATIONAL SECURITY
There are honest liberals who consider the Communist Party of the
United States as just another "political party" in the American tradi-
tion of political parties. Those who would uphold "the rights" of Com-
munist Party members and its sympathizers justify these "rights"
from the writings of Jefferson. Particular stress is laid upon the follow-
ing quotation from his first inaugural: 3
"If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to
change its republician form, let them stand undisturbed as monu-
ments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated,
where reason is left free to combat it."
The market place of ideas, in which Jefferson believed truth would
triumph over error, was conceived of as embracing the honest and open
exchange of opinion by free people. He did not speak of a clandestine
effort where reason was not free from restraints imposed by compulsory
adherence to a "party line" which sacrifices integrity to a political end.
The fact is that we are dealing not with a loyal opposition but
with the party of Leninism, a philosophy described by the Russian com-
mentator, Ivanov,1 4 as:
". .. the inspiring and guiding ideological force of the Bol-
shevist party and the whole Soviet people ... [and as] the in-
spiring and guiding ideological weapon of Communist and Work-
ers' parties, of tens and hundreds of millions of laboring people
throughout the world, in their struggle for liberation from a cap-
italist slavery and the horrors of imperialist wars."
Unless we have some understanding of the basic philosophy of the
Party and its members, and some appreciation of the manner of selec-
tion and disciplining of these members, we cannot comprehend the
danger.
The basic concept of the Communist Party, its structural organi-
zation and its announced objectives are all foreign to the ordinary
American political party.
Stalin, developing Lenin's teachings on the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, declares that the Party is the instrument through which the
12. Lyos, THE Ram DE CADE 400-1 (1941).
13. BoWmRs, THE INAUGm!AL ADDRESSES OF THE PassmMr.-s 50, 52 (1929).
14. Ivanov, Leninism: The Victorious Banmwr of the Intentlional Prolclariu,
VoPRosY EcoNolIX, January 1949, pp. 24-44, summarized in 1 CUrMaENT DxGsT oF THE
SovIEr PREss 18-3 (May 31, 1949).
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proletariat will overthrow and suppress the bourgeoisie and establish
a strong government capable of settling its "scores dictatorially with
the class enemies." 15
The Party is the "advanced conscious detachment of the working
class," as a model of discipline and organization capable of directing
the struggle of the working class in a planned and organized fashion.
To carry out its task the Party must be "strong in its integration and
iron conscious discipline." According to Stalin, it is "a unity of will
incompatible with the existence of factions in it." Accordingly it can
tolerate no freedom for the existence of such factions and must con-
stantly purge itself of all opportunist elements which are the source of
such factionism.
In 1929 such a purge was ordered to be carried out in the American
Communist Party by the Executive Committee of the Communist
International meeting in Moscow. Stalin, speaking at the meeting, de-
clared that :16
"The importance of the decision [to purge the ranks of the Amer-
ican Communist Party] consists in the very fact that it will make it
easier for the American Communist Party to put an end to un-
principled factionalism, create unity in the Party and finally enter
on the broad path of mass political work. No, comrades, the Amer-
ican Communist Party will not perish. It will live and flourish to
the dismay of the enemies of the working class. Only one small fac-
tional group will perish if it continues to be stubborn, if it does not
submit to the will of the Comintern, if it continues to adhere to its
errors. But the fate of one small faction must in no case be iden-
tified with the fate of the American Communist Party. Because one
small factional group is liable to perish politically, it does not follow,
that the American Communist Party must perish. And, if it is in-
evitable that this small factional group perish, then let it perish,
as long as the Communist Party will grow and develop."
The Party, accepting the decision heralded by Stalin, declared
that :"
"Strong with bolshevik self-criticism, boldly exposing, criticising,
and correcting the past and present errors, the American Party
will follow the path of bolshevization enlightened by Stalin's
speeches, and will be worthy of Stalin's definition of our Party as
'one of the few Communist Parties in the world upon which history
15. Yudin, The Development by Stalin of the Teaching of the Dictatorship of the
Proletariat, Pravda, April 27, 1949, pp. 2-3, summarized in 1 CuRRENT DIGEsT OF THE
SoviET PREsS 17-45 (May 24, 1949).
16. See Stalin's speech delivered in the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. on the American
question, May 14, 1929, printed in STALIN's SPEECHEs ON rH AMERICAN COMMUNIST
PARTY 39 (1929) (CPUSA Pamphlet) (cited hereafter as STALIn's SPrEEcHnES).
17. STA 's SPEECHES, 10.
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has laid tasks of a decisive character from the point of view of the
world revolutionary movement.'"
The current purges in Southeast Europe evidence the continued
necessity for such constant purification of its membership felt by the
Party.
In Hungary, for example, the London Times 18 reports that 7,000
control commissions comprised of 30,000 party members have scru-
tinized the total membership of over one million people and have
excluded from membership about 17%. The Times Budapest corre-
spondent says that "The Communist Party is intended to be the his-
torical instrument with which the past is excised and the future
moulded, its character sharp, steely, composed and unalloyed."
Throughout Southeastern Europe, it appears that the procedure is for
members to appear before the Control Commission to disclose their
moral and political autobiography, expressing on their own, errors no
one else could know about. The aim of the Communists has been to re-
fine their membership to what a Rumanian writer describes as a
"gold reserve" of the revolutionary forces.
The party as thus conceived operates within a rigid hierarchical
structure organized from the Politburo to the lowest echelon of local
and factory cells tied into the Party and rules by Part:y directives.
The activities of the Party are dominated by the principle of central-
ism. 9 This is not inconsistent with the practice of decentralizing party
operations through groups and cells and committees. Thus, it attains
security and at the same time insures that the Party's presence and
the influence of the Center is felt in many places at the same time. In
this way one group communicates with another group only through
the all-powerful Center which tolerates no opinions in conflict with
those it currently defines.
W~ihat the party and its discipline produces is best described by A.
Rossi.29 He stresses that in the Communist hierarchy of values "the
Party stands above class and still further above the nation." He
points out that Party spirit may well coincide with national spirit,
i.e., with patriotism; where, however, party spirit clashes with patrio-
tism, the latter must give way; but there are some situations in which
party spirit includes patriotism within it for the time being; and at
such times patriotism becomes one of the elements in Communist
strategy.
The Party, according to Rossi, asserts control over every aspect of
the lives of the militant members. It recognizes no dividing line be-
tween the political and the personal. The Party is a movement to which
18. May 31, 1949, p. 5, col. 5.
19. Rossr, PPHYSIOLOGIm Du PARTI Con uI isr FnA.cois 297 (1943).
20. Ibid. See especially c. XXV.
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the militant belongs, a community in which he lives, and a way of life
in which he participates. Devotion to the Party is the sine qua non of
the Communist, and the man who is devoted to the Party is devoted to
the Party's leaders, to whom he owes a debt that can be paid only with
faith and obedience. The spirit of initiative and responsibility is,
therefore, also identified with "unshakeable faith in the Party and its
leaders."
The Party, thus, emphasizes homogeneity and cohesion; exacts in
certain respects automatic obedience. But it does not wish to destroy
the militants' will to act or the mind that guides that will.
The leadership, and under its tutelage the militants themselves, must
therefore strike a nice balance: automatic obedience where automatic
obedience is called for, phis the intelligence and awareness required by
the Party's purposes. Or, if you like, automatic obedience that sub-
ordinates the higher faculties of the man and yet, within certain
narrow limits, develops them-though only to subordinate them the
more completely. The perfectly trained militant can be counted on
for this kind of automatic obedience; and the task of the Party's
psychologists and teachers is to produce him.
Summarizing these basic elements in the Communist Party struc-
ture and philosophy, Rossi declares: 21
"Like Sorel's evangelical socialism, the Communism of the Com-
munist party is a societas perfecta, with its own values, its own
hierarchy, its own structure, and its own mores-a society within-
a-society which regards itself as destined to destroy the society it
is within. Your true Communist thinks of himself as already a cit.
izen of another polity, as subordinated to its laws even as he awaits
the time when he can impose them upon others. The Party is the
model-in-miniature of the new society, and it is all the easier to
recognize as such because that new society already lives and has
its being over a sixth of the earth's surface."
How does such a force operate in a given country selected for pen-
etration? The answer is the Fifth Column. While not new as a tactical
weapon, the Nazis by 1939 had developed and perfected this dan-
gerous device to an extent and intensity hitherto unknown. But this
has been developed even further by the Soviet Union.
The Russian Fifth Column is different from that of the Nazis. The
Nazis had small groups of adherents in the democratic countries, and
their espionage apparatus was more limited. Nazism had no real base
in the United States. The Communist Fifth Column, on the other
hand, seeks to identify itself with every social grievance. Russian
espionage and subversive operations are made up of trained and skilled
spy technicians and intelligence officers, propaganda specialists, ex-
perts in spreading rumor.
21. Id. at 302.
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Instruction is planned so that the agent will find it as easy for a
minority to operate a labor union, or a pacifist league, or any other
such movement, as it is for a minority group to control a large corpo-
ration when most of the stockholders take no active interest in the
management.
In all countries, the Communists stress the tactical importance of
the channels of public information. They give strict attention to the
development of their own press abroad, both popular dailies and
weeklies and, on the more esoteric level, technical tactics provide for the
infiltration by Communists and sympathizers into radio, movies, book
publishing, and even music and other arts. Stress is placed upon the
seizure of newsprint and other printing forms. Special care is taken
to develop the Communist control of labor in key industries-in-
dustries rated as of special importance either for warmaking or for
disrupting a nation's economy.
In his article already quoted, Ivanov says that there are militant
Communist parties in almost all countries-working underground in
conditions of the fiercest terror. In their struggle with the fascist
occupiers, workers and Communists learned and mastered the art of
waging partisan struggle in all its forms, including armed partisan
warfare.2 2 When the Fifth Column through trade union control and
infiltration of government agencies captures the instrumentalities of
transportation and communication we can appreciate the effect of that
kind of warfare.
With regard to the American Communist Party, Ivanov states that
"the existence of huge proletarian masses, the difficult position of the
workers, etc., create objectively favorable conditions for developing
the work and increasing the influence of the Communist Party among
the working people." Despite the powerful opposition of the capitalist
monopoly Ivanov writes that: 2
3
"The uninterrupted baiting of the Communist Party, organized by
the forces of reaction, the official 'crusade' conducted against it,
the judicial persecution of its leaders, etc.-all this is evidence that
the capitalists, in spite of their huge wealth and dictatorial power,
are not at all certain of the stability of their positions."
For the last 6 months, in the United States District Court in New
York City, eleven Communist leaders have been on trial for con-
spiracy to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government by
force and violence.
So far the answer of the indicted leaders has been that their Party is
an American party, fighting for economic improvement and civil
liberties; that while it is "much interested" in the policies of Com-
22. Ivanov, supra note 14, at 18-7.
23. Id. at 18-9.
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munism abroad it is not bound by them here. These defendants assert
that this country evidences strong tendencies towards fascism and
dictatorship and contend that the American reactionaries will employ
violence to resist the assumption of power by the proletariat-only
then, they say, would the Communist Party resort to force and vio-
lence.
Certain of the defendants conceded that the Party regarded Stalin's
"History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union" as a guide to
action in this country.
The defendant Gilbert Green, one of the eleven defendants of the
Communist Party American Politburo, under cross-examination 24
1. Admitted that he had pledged himself to follow the teachings of
Stalin and to remain forever faithful to Stalin's leadership for the
triumph of world revolution.
2. Admitted that contrary to his direct testimony, he had been for
years advocating the overthrow of this Government by force and
violence.
3. Admitted that he had used more false names and told more lies
under oath than he cared to remember.
4. Admitted that he took part in a pledge to Stalin by delegates from
65 countries at the 1935 Comintern or Communist Internationale meet-
ing at Moscow. Among other American leaders who took part in the
pledge he named William Z. Foster, the Party's present leader, and
Earl Browder, then its leader.
5. Admitted that he had written an article in the January, 1934, issue
of the Communist, the Party's theoretical organ, in which he had urged
the indoctrination of American youth "in the armed forces, labor camps
and factories" on how to use firearms "for the class war" in "turning
imperialist war into class war" and in "the overthrow of American
capitalism for a Soviet America."
At the recent perjury trial of Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, an
avowed former Communist Party member, testified on cross-examina-
tion that he had taken a false and perjurious oath of office in connection
with securing a government position with the National Research Proj-
ect. In response to defense counsel's question as to Chambers' at-
titude towards taking such an oath, Chambers replied: "I mean to
indicate that I was a Communist, and that my conscience didn't
bother me." 25
The reading and analysis of Communist literature; the speeches of
24. N. Y. Times, July 6, 1949, p. 8, col. 3.
25. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1949, p. 1, col. 8. See also Lenin's statement with reference
to cooperation that "anything we receive for nothing is all right. This must be one of
the tactics of Bolshevism. The question is one of utilization not compromise." Quoted
by KYoYusHA, AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF JAPAN 65 (unpublished
translation; undated).
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communistic leaders; the observation of party movements clearly
demonstrate that: 2,
1. The Communist Party is not a political party in the usual Aner-
ican sense. Rather, it is, by its own constitution, a closely knit, dis-
ciplined organization which tolerates no internal differences on points
of fundamental political doctrine as laid down by the Party. Rossi .-
shows that it takes on the cloak of legality--when it seems expedient
to do so. It accepts the rules of the democratic process only while it is
too weak to do otherwise.
2. It is founded upon and adheres to the political philosophies of
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and in its present current literature
insists there can be no watering down of these philosophies.
3. In adherence to these philosophies, it stands for the complete over-
throw of the capitalistic system and the substitution in its place of a
socialistic form of government. This government would be controlled
entirely by, and in the interest of, a rather nebulously defined group,
called the working class, under the leadership of the Communist Party.
No party of opposition would be permitted. In this latter respect, and
undoubtedly in other respects, it differs fundamentally from the So-
cialist Party of the United States and the Labor Party of England.
4. American Communists defend and follow the Russian and world
Communist program in almost every detail. Whether this identity of
thought and policy results from following orders from abroad, or from
a blind and automatic imitation, or as the natural consequence of a
common philosophy does not alter the fact that the Party% consistently
does support Russian and world Communist programs rather than
those supported by the overwhelming majority of people in this
country.
5. The Communist Party of the United States admits of no possible
compromise with any other political philosophy, save as a temporary
tactical process. In this it adheres to the fundamental Marxian con-
cept that it has the one true political faith and that all others must
and inevitably will succumb. It demands freedom for itself only to
carry on its struggle for power.
6. In those countries such as Southeastern Europe it controls the
trade unions, the municipality, the police force and other administra-
26. The basic propositions expressed in this summary are derived essentially from the
Findings on the Communist Party drafted on the basis of extensive hearings by the Com-
mittee of the Faculty on Tenure and Academic Freedom at the University of Washington,
Jan. 7, 1949 (mimeographed). See also, President Raymond B. Allen's statements in
debate on the subject, "Should Communists Be Allowed To Teach In Our Sehcols;" re-
printed in Talks, July, 1949, p. 10. See also Cohen & Fuchs, Communisin's Challcnge a:d
the Constitution, 34 CoxRNLL L.Q. 182, 133-5 (1948) ; and Report of House Committee on
Un-American Activities, summarized in N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1949, p. 1, col. 2.
27. Rossi, op. cit. supra note 19, at 297.
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tive apparatus. The Communist policeman will not defend the public
order his party tells him to destroy. The Communist judge will render
only those decisions which will further the interest of the Communist
cause.
These practical and well-substantiated incidents of subversion bring
into sharp focus the dangers presented by the presence within a
state of militant and convinced Communist Party members. The
statement of the Communist Party at the time of the negotiation of
the Atlantic Pact illustrates the direct challenge which the Party pre-
sents to the security of a nation. 28 It is a formal announcement that
neither the local Communist Party nor its leaders can be counted on
in the time of danger. This should illustrate that these leaders had al-
ready enlisted under the banner of Stalinism and they were pledged in
their allegiance and their loyalty to treason. It makes the question of
subversion a real one. Governments are pressed by their people to
meet it by action.
The so-called Loyalty Program of the United States represents one
response to that demand. While many sectors of our national life are
potential targets for such subversion, requiring a variety of counter
attack techniques, the Loyalty Program is illustrative of one such
technique designed by the Government to protect the integrity of its
personnel against the threatened subversive efforts of the Soviet Union
and its weapon of revolution, the Communist Party.
Recognizing that the Loyalty Program deals with but one facet of
this problem, let us examine it to determine:
1. Whether it violates the constitutional rights of the government
employees who are affected by its provisions; and
2. If it does not, is it effective in uncovering disloyalty?
THE CURRENT LOYALTY PROGRAMI: CRITIcAL APPRAIsAL
Over two million persons are employed by the Federal Government.
They represent a cross-section of opinion, talent and ancestry in Amer-
ica. On March 21, 1947 all of them became subject to the present
loyalty program which President Truman established by Executive
Order.
28. Thorez, the French Communist leader, expressed the view shared by the others:
"We deny that our Government has the right to sign the Atlantic Pact .... We shall
carry on the battle of France against the imperialistic war." And he asked the question,
"Could the workers and peoples of France have any other attitude towards the Soviet
Army (if it arrived on French soil) than has been that of the peoples of Poland, Rumania
and Yugoslavia?" N. Y. Times, March 3, 1949, p. 5, col. 1; p. 1, col. 4. Sharkey, general
secretary of the Australian Communist Party, was recently convicted for uttering seditious
words on account of a similar declaration. Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1949, p. 9,
col. 4.
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When the Loyalty Review Board was set up, President Truman
stated: 29
"[D]isloyal and subversive elements must be removed from the
employ of the Government. We must not, however, permit employ-
ees of the Federal Government to be labeled as disloyal or poten-
tially disloyal to their Government when no valid basis exists for
arriving at such a conclusion. . . Rumor, gossip, or suspicion
will not be sufficient to lead to the dismissal of an employee for dis-
loyalty."
Nevertheless, criticism has been aimed at this program. Charges
have been directed at its methods, its alleged unfairness.
Its necessity has been challenged. It has been condemned as a means
of preserving the status quo against new concepts. Its scope, both as
regards the acts which it proscribes and the employees which it reaches,
has been regarded as too broad.
Evaluation of Basic Premises Underlying Loyalty Program
Basic to much of this criticism lies a serious doubt as to whether the
Government can constitutionally initiate a program of this type. It
is this fundamental premise, therefore, that must be examined before
the actual operation of the program is considered. The problem has
two aspects: does the Government have a right to examine into the
loyalty qualifications of its employees; and does it owe any correspond-
ing duty to protect these employees against unjustified rejections or
dismissals from government service.
Right of Government to Enact Measures for the Protection of Nalional
Security. The right of government to adopt measures to protect itself
from conduct which imports a threat to national security is well es-
tablished. 3 It has been argued, however,'that the exercise of this right
should be conditioned on a finding that a clear and present danger is
presented sufficient to warrant the enactment of regulatory legisla-
tion.31 Although the clear and present danger rule was originally con-
ceived by Justice Holmes in Sczenck v. United States as a test of the
constitutionality of the 1917 Espionage Act itself, 2 the concept shifted
29. N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 2, col. 2.
30. See cases cited in notes 32 and 36 infra. The great majority of federal statutes
looking towards the protection of national security are applicable in times of pece as
well as war; see, e.g., 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U.S.C. §§ 31-2 (1946) (espionage); 54
STAT. 670 (1940), IS U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (1946) (subversive activities) ; 35 St.r. 10s (1909),
18 U.S.C. §4 (1946) (incitement to rebellion) ; 35 STAT. 1039 (1909), 1 U.S.C §6 (1946;
(seditious conspiracy) ; 40 STAT. 226 (1917), IS U.S.C. § 93 (1946) (illegal possession or
control of government papers or property); 54 ST. 1220 (1918), 50 U.S.C. §§ 101-6
(1946) (sabotage) ; 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U.S.C §33 (1946) (control of propaganda
and rumor limited to period of war).
31. See discussion of the cases by Emerson & Helfeld, smpra note 3, at S6.
32. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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in later cases to an evidentiary test of the applicability of the statute
to the particular acts in issue.3 3 Its subsequent development in cases
dealing with a variety of civil rights indicates its utilization by the
courts for both purposes.3 4 Nevertheless, in general the rule has not
been applied in either form to legislation involving national security
since the decision in the Schenck case in 1919.11
The constitutional test generally applied to legislation involving
measures designed to protect national security has rather been the
reasonableness of the regulation in the light of the danger sought to be
guarded against. 36 When this approach to national security legislation
is coupled with the traditionally sympathetic approach of the courts
to legislation restricting the civil rights of Government employees,3" it
seems clear that any program undertaken by the Government with
regard to restrictions on the employment of federal civil servants will
not be required to meet a constitutional standard of clear and present
danger in any form.3" It is therefore sufficient if there exists a reason-
able relationship between the security and efficiency of government
service and the restriction imposed on the employment of disloyal
persons as defined in the Loyalty Order.
Application of the so-called test of reasonableness in determining the
33. See, e.g., dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (indictment under 1917 espionage act) and United States v. Schaeffer,
251 U.S. 466 (1920) (same). In both these cases a majority of the court held that proof
of the "bad tendency" of defendant's words was sufficient for conviction.'34. In several cases involving conviction under state criminal syndicalism statutes,
the clear and present danger rule was utilized by Holmes and Brandeis as an evidnfiary
test of defendant's acts. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (concurring opin-
ion) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (dissenting opinion). On the other
hand, the rule has been applied in both majority and dissenting opinions as a test of con-
stitutionality: Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Texas registration statute gov-
erning labor organizers invalidated) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1942) (state
judicial contempt statute invalidated); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (dissenting opinion) (state use of injunction power to
regulate picketing accompanied by violence sustained) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (state statute regulating solicitation of money for religious causes invalidated).
35. See cases cited in notes 33 and 34 .supra and 36 infra.
36. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (West Coast curfew
order affecting persons of Japanese ancestry) ; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) ;
Fisk v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (state criminal syndicalism statutes); Butler v.
United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943) (1917
espionage statute) ; Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 790 (1943) (Alien Registration Act of 1940); United States v. Pelley, 132
F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943) (1917 Espionage Act).
37. See, e.g., United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1943);
Notes, 60 HAv. L. Rav. 779 (1947) and 47 CoL L. REv. 1161 (1947).
38. See note 36 stupra. This conclusion would seem to be borne out by lower court
decisions sustaining the constitutionality of the program, notes 43 and 44 infra.
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constitutionality of a loyalty program such as that embraced in the
President's Executive Order is supported by sound principles of prac-
tice as well as by constitutional authority. Justice Sanford pointed
out in the Gitlow 39 decision:
"for yet more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances en-
dangering the foundations of organized government and threatening
its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own existence as a
constitutional State. Freedom of speech and press, said Story . . .
does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt
to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or
teachings which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to
impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties.
. . . In short this freedom does not deprive a state of the primary
and essential right of self-preservation; which, so long as human
governments endure, they cannot be denied."
Right of Government Employees to Due Process. There is no constitu-
tional guarantee per se of governmental employment of citizens. Nor
does it violate a citizen's rights to require that he will do his utmost to
make our kind of government work and will join in no effort to make it
fail. Indeed it is traditional in American politics to assume that govern-
ment employees will be in sympathy with the basic American philos-
ophy of government within which all parties function. Moreover, as
respects Cabinet officers and top policy-making or administrative
officials, the principle has long been adhered to that such officials should
change with the changing tides of election to insure that their views
will generally accord with those of the party elected to power. The
philosophy underlying both these principles was early laid down by
George Washington when he declared :
"I shall not, whilst I have the honor to administer the government,
bring a man into any office of consequence moningly, whose
political tenets are adverse to the tenets which the general govern-
ment are pursuing; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of po-
litical suicide."
This principle has been reflected in numerous early decisions sus-
taining the right of the Government, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, to discharge its employees without assigning any reason
therefor.41 With the introduction of the merit system, however, Con-
gress has now limited executive freedom of action in this regard and has
39. Gitlow v. New York, 263 U. S. 652, 667-S (1925).
40. WILSON, GEoaGS WASHINGTON 307 (1896).
41. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903); Reagen v. United States, 182
U.S. 419 (1901); Morgan v. TVA, 115 F2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), ccrt. dc;icd, 312
U.S. 701 (1941); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Meyers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; Borak v. Biddle, 141 F2d 278 (D. C. Cir. 1944).
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stipulated that the great bulk of government employees may not be
dismissed except for cause. The courts have implied from this a right
on the part of the employee to a hearing prior to dismissal.4" The first
case to reach the courts involving a dismissal on loyalty grounds 11
proceeded on a premise of complete absence of right in an aggrieved
employee to procedural due process in the hearing granted prior to
dismissal. The cases relied on by the court in support of this con-
clusion would not seem in fact to sustain the proposition. Neverthe-
less, the court's position has been followed in two lower court deci-
sions sustaining the constitutionality of the program, although in one
case the court noted as "unusual" the fact that neither the evidence nor
its source had been disclosed to the defendant. 44 In so far as the general
hiring and firing policies of the Government are concerned, the sound-
ness of judicial policy in refusing to insist on full procedural due process
plus a right to judicial review cannot be doubted.
But dismissal proceedings on grounds of disloyalty constitute a some-
what different issue, more nearly comparable to the special instances
of curtailment imposed upon private employers. The practical con-
sequences to an individual either of an unjust dismissal by the Govern-
ment on a charge of disloyalty or of an unjustified interference with his
legitimate union activities by a private employer would seem to be the
same-a man's reputation as well as his ability to earn a livelihood may
be seriously jeopardized.45
Moreover, in the case of the Loyalty Program as a whole, public
42. Although generally where Congress has specified the causes which can give
rise to a dismissal it has also provided for notice and hearing, the Supreme Court has
ruled that such a hearing must be granted whether provided for or not wherever a dis-
missal is in fact predicated on the enumerated causes. Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U.S. 311 (1903).
43. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, 159 F. 2d 22 (D. C. Cir. 1946), cert. delded, 330
U.S. 838 (1947). The court justified its decision by analogizing the dismissal by the
agency to that category of administrative activities authorized by statute which the Courts
have traditionally regarded as in the nature of instructions by the Government to its agents
creating duties thus to the Government alone rather than rights in the individuals af-
fected. The cases relied on in support of this principle included Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940) (suit by private contractor charging erroneous wage deter-
mination by Secretary of Labor); and Butte, Anaconda and Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 290 U.S. 127 (1933) (ICC payment of deficit incurred by private carrier not
recoverable by United States on ground it was paid in error).
44. In a suit for reinstatement brought by Dorothy Bailey, Federal Judge Holtzoff
ruled that he could not set aside Federal Loyalty Board findings. N. Y. Times, July 29,
1949, p. 9, col. 2. One month earlier Judge Holtzoff upheld the constitutionality of the
program and dismissed an action for a declaratory judgment brought by twenty-six em-
ployees of the Post Office Department asserting that the Loyalty Program was unconstitu.
tional as a denial of plaintiffs' right of free speech. Washington v. Clark, 18 U. S. L.
WEEK 2036 (D.D.C. June 28, 1949).
45. Several specific instances indicate the increasing trend to bar Communist meni-
bers and sympathizers from obtaining work. E.g., the recent Consolidated Edison union
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support and confidence are essential to its effective and successful
enforcement. The present lack of confidence and confusion stems
from a feeling either conscious or unconscious that the traditional con-
cepts of American fair play are being disregarded. Court review would
go a long way towards refuting this attitude.
Either the judiciary or the Congress should recognize the right of an
individual employee to come into court and obtain a re,iew both of the
substantive finding of disloyalty and of the type of hearing granted,
if not as a matter of legal right -6 then as a matter of sound public policy.
contract requiring a Loyalty Oath from all union members, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1949,
p. 20, col. 7; the movement among educators to close the teaching doors to Communists,
see editorial summary of President Allen's action in University of Washington, X. Y.
Herald Tribune, Jan. 30, 1949, II, p. 3, col. 4 and of New York State's proposal to legislate
their removal from the state educational system, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1949, p. 1, col. 2;1
and the ousting of Reverend Dr. Melish and his son from a Brooldyn parish, see, e.g.,
Bishop De Wolfe's statement on removal of Dr. Melish, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1949,
p. 11, coL 1. This development was foreshadowed by the Congress in 1940 when it pro-
vided in the Selective Service and Training Act that it was the express policy of the Con-
gress that employers should be prohibited from hiring Communist Party members to fill
vacancies left by their employees' service in the armed forces. 54 STAT. SRO (1940), 50
U.S.C. § 308(i) (1946). So far as is known this policy was never raised in question in the
courts and it is inferable that it remained a dead letter.
Most recent of the legal sanctions imposed on individuals by reason of their disloyalt-
is the California Superior Court decision holding that it is an implied condition in c'cry
employment contract that the employee is not a Communist, a violation of which con-
stitutes valid ground for non-perfomance by the employer. This extraordinary judicial
reasoning, while undoubtedly deserving of reversal on appeal, is a gross e:ample of
the present climate of thought with regard to those charged or found to be disloyal
by reason of Communist affiliations. Cole v. Loews, Inc., 17 U.S.L. Wxri- 2403 (Calif.
Super. Ct, Feb. 11, 1949). The California court's decision would seem to provide an
efficient means of enforcing the Congressional policy announced in 1940 if an employer
desired to take advantage of it However, a similar action for reinstatement brought
by Cole against AfGM in the California District Court has apparently resulted in a
decision favorable to plaintiff Cole and his reinstatement by the court. In the absence
of a copy of the decision, it is impossible to determine the basis for the court's decision
although it is reasonable to conclude that the court did not accept the reasoning in the
State court's opinion referred to above; for a brief report of the district court's deci-
sion, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1948, p. 10, col. 2. A potent e:tra-legal sanction is the
recent Papal excommunication order. See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1949, p. 10, col. 2.
46. It should be pointed out that the courts have been willing to make an exception
to their policies against a judicial review de zovo of the acts of administrative officials
when the serious nature of the consequences would seem to justify this action. See, for
example, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) and Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135 (1945). And whre the basis for the administrative action depended on
jurisdictional facts, the court has asserted its right to reexamine the administrative find-
ing as to the existence of these facts. See, for example, Ng Fung Ho ,. White, 259
U.S. 276 (1922) (trial de noz'o on the issue of citizenship in a deportation proceeding) ;
see Borak v. Biddle, 141 F. 2d 278 (D. C. Cir. 1944) (dismissed employee seeks
review of action on ground no notice and hearing granted; court reversed agency finding
that plaintiff was still within probationary period and therefore not entitled to notice
and hearing). It should be noted, however, that in both these situations an initial right
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Workings of Loyalty Boards 4
In practice here is approximately the way the Loyalty Program
works. All employees who were in federal service prior to October,
1947, execute Form 84 which sets forth sufficient biographical data to
identify the individual properly. Applicants for federal service are
required to fill out a different, though similar, form. These forms are
processed through the employing agency and the Civil Service Com-
mission respectively and forwarded to the FBI; the files of the FBI are
searched with respect to the individual concerned, and if there is, in
the opinion of the FBI, sufficient information in their files to warrant
the undertaking of a full field investigation, then this is done.4" The
employing agency or the Civil Service Commission is notified that such
an investigation is being instituted by the FBI. When the reports of
a full field investigation are completed, they are submitted either to the
Civil Service Commission or through the Commission to the agency
concerned.
Agencies operating under the President's Loyalty Program are re-
quired to have a Loyalty Board which is empowered to act upon the
reports of FBI investigations. In the case of applicants, the hearing
body is the Regional Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission.
As a practical matter, it is understood that these reports are reviewed
by three members of the Board, and if, in the opinion of the Board,
there is sufficient derogatory information to cause charges to be pre-
ferred against the individual then this is done. Or an interrogatory
requesting further information on a particular subject may be dis-
patched to the employee. If, on the other hand, the Board feels that
the individual may be cleared without the benefit of further informa-
tion, then the Board meets in executive session and a recommendation
to judicial review existed and the court seized upon these factors to justify an extenslon
of its normal review procedure.
In another related field, members of Congress have already indicated their aware-
ness of the necessity of protecting the rights of individuals whose reputation may be
adversely drawn in question by governmental action. A concurrent resolution is now
before Congress which would guarantee any individual under investigation or charges
by a Congressional committee the right inter alia to testify in his own behalf, to sum-
mon up to four witnesses and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. N.Y. Times, July 21,
1949, p. 1, col. 7.
47. Unless otherwise indicated, material in this section is based upon Statement,
Regulations and Directives of the Loyalty Review Board as revised through Dec. 17,
1948 (mimeographed) ; and upon conversations which the senior author had with agency
representatives, members of agency loyalty boards and lawyers who have represented
employees at loyalty hearings.
48. As J. Edgar Hoover has pointed out, the role of the FBI in the implementation of
the Loyalty Program is confined to two main functions: to check fingerprints and name,,l
of federal employees and applicants against its files; and to obtain and report facts as-
certained during its investigation. Hoover, A Comment on the Article "Loyalty Among
Government Employees," 58 YALE L.J. 401 (1949).
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is submitted to the agency official who has the authority to make final
determinations in such matters.
It would appear that most agencies operating under the Loyalty
Program have limited assistance in their operations. In some agencies
this assistance is in the form of clerical help only. In others, a legal
officer or counsellor is designated to advise the agency Loyalty Board.
An administrative staff is required, as reports must be made to the
Civil Service Commission and the administrative and clerical functions
of the Board must be handled. In some instances someone must ex-
plain the nature of the charges or discuss the charges with the accused
prior to a hearing.
It is understood that in certain departments before the Loyalty
Board acts on a specific case, the members of the Board discuss the
relevant facts with appropriate technical employees of the particular
department. These individuals can often give valuable assistance re-
garding implications of organizational memberships, etc. It would
appear that if a Loyalty Program is to continue, this practice should
be encouraged and all agency Boards should be urged to consult ith
the technical staffs in the agency who have knowledge of Communist
trends and are informed on political philosophies and subversive
techniques.
If a hearing is required, it is conducted in accordance with the pro-
visions of the President's Loyalty Program and the accused is permitted
the benefit of counsel, defense witnesses, etc. Under present procedures,
the investigating agencies other than the employing agencies are
called upon to develop the case at the hearing. This places a burden
upon the FBI which it was never designed to carry. The Director of
that organization says that the FBI reports the facts; it does not eval-
uate the information developed in its investigations. Experience in-
dicates that persons so charged, for the most part, have merely at-
tempted to refute the allegations made concerning them with favorable
testimony or affidavits submitted by persons acquainted with them.
These "defense witnesses" often merely attest to the good character
and loyalty of the individual, if these characteristics are known to
them. All agency Loyalty Board actions are, of course, subject to
review by the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.
In making its check of these two-million odd cases,"0 the Federal
Bureau of Investigation found 7,667 cases in which a full field investi-
gation appeared advisable. Of these, about 1700 cases were discon-
tinued, either because the people involved had left the Government or
because further study showed that the investigation was unnecessary.
It may be worth noting that 494 of these cases proved to be simple
cases of mistaken indentity.
49. Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, March 27, 1949, p. AG, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 1949, p. 4, col. S; Jan. 16, 1949, IV, p. 6, col. 5; and April 5, 1949, p. 17, col. 1.
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Thus far, the agencies of the Federal Government have completed
action on 3,091 cases in which a full investigation had been carried out
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of these, 2,916 employees
were cleared of all suspicion of disloyalty, and 174 resigned under fire or
were rated ineligible for Government employment. 124 of the latter
appealed from the adverse verdict; 27 cases have been heard by Review
Board Panels. In 16 cases the employees were cleared and in the re-
maining 11 cases the original verdict of ineligibility was upheld. There
are now pending in the hands of the various Government agencies 107
cases.
Evaluation of Specific Criticisms Levelled A gainst Loyalty Program
It might appear that a detailed discussion of the criticisms directed
at the Program is academic in view of the fact that such controversies
as have arisen over its implementation have become substantially moot
with the virtual completion of the Program. In fact, however, if the
Program is to be continued in any form, it is essential that the under-
lying objections-both substantive and procedural-be carefully
analyzed so that any further development of the Program can proceed
on the wisest possible basis.
Substantive Problems. There are two major objections directed against
the substantive provisions of the Loyalty Order: first, that they are not
sufficiently flexible to cover all cases where an agency seeks to dismiss
an employee for reasons of security; and second, that they are too
ambiguous and indefinite to apprise the individual employee of the
prohibited conduct or to furnish the administrators of the program
with anything more than a blank check to "probe the records and
past'associations of individual employees with little guide other than
their own notions of what is disloyal or subversive." Intermingled with
this latter criticism is the feeling that existing legislation, exclusive of
the President's Executive Order, is sufficient to deal with treasonable
activities.
On a substantive level it would appear that the provisions of the
Loyalty Order are sufficiently broad to embrace the major dangers or
threats presented to national security by the employment of disloyal
individuals in federal service: to wit, the transmission of confidential
information to foreign powers; the formulation or implementation of
Congressional or executive policies either in an attempt to further the
aims of a foreign power and undermine the expressed interests of the
United States, or in furtherance of an attempt to overthrow the Gov-
ernment by force or violence; and finally, wilful attempts to impede or
destroy the morale of Government workers to the same ends.
With regard to the argument based on the lack of necessity for the
Loyalty Program, it should be noted that while the transmission of
confidential information is already punishable under existing legis-
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lation,5 1 the latter two threats outlined above do not seem to be pun-
ishable expressly under any existing statute except perhaps that re-
lating to treason-a crime which has never been prosecuted except in
time of war. Even were existing statutes adequate to punish these
types of activities, it is not clear that similarly adequate detection
techniques are presently provided for. While counter espionage can
be utilized for the detection of employees who transmit confidential
material to unauthorized persons, it cannot be said that such techniques
will be successful with regard to those employees who engage in more
subtle overt acts such as the impairment of morale or the performance
of their assigned tasks in the interests of a foreign power. Other types
of investigatory techniques such as are provided for in the Loyalty
Order are necessary for the detection of these activities.
There remain for consideration the contentions advanced by some
that the standard is too broad and indefinite to provide the loyal civil
servant with sufficient protection against unjustified charges and
dismissal.
Implicit in this criticism is the assumption that the standard of dis-
loyalty laid down in the Executive Order fails to require proof of knowl-
edge and intent on the part of the employee; that this failure thus
enables the triers of fact to employ their own judgment as to what con-
stitutes, for example, conduct "in furtherance of the aims and interests
of a foreign power," and that the inevitable result of this is a deteriora-
tion of the program into a prosecution of the deviational thinker.
The extreme position that the program is designed to penalize the
non-conformist is not borne out by the facts.3t Available evidence in-
dicates that, at least at the level of the Loyalty Review Board proceed-
ing, either knowledge .2 of the employee of the subversive nature of an
organization with which he has been associated or his intent 53 to fur-
50. Note 30 supra.
51. The Loyalty Review Board has repeatedly stated that the program is not intended
to extend to the advocacy of any change in the form of government or the economic
system of the United States however far reaching, unless such advocacy is coupled
with the advocacy of illegal or violent measures to accomplish the change. Statement
of the Loyalty Review Board, Dec. 23, 1947 (mimeographed). This position has b=en
reiterated affirmatively by statements of the Board. Ibid.
52. Chairman Richardson has stated explicitly in his directions to regional loyalty
boards that "the probative value of evidence of past or present membership in affiliation
or sympathetic association with, any one or more of the organizations nov, or hereafter
designated by the Attorney General can be fairly evaluated only after determining, so
far as possible, the character of the organization, the period, nature and duration of
the association, whether the employee or applicant was avare of the subversive character
of the organization at the time of the association and the nature of his activities in
connection with such organization." Statement of Seth Richardson, Chairman of the
Loyalty Review Board, Dec. 23, 1947.
53. Insistence by the Loyalty Review Board on some evidence of personal intent look-
ing towards disloyalty is evident in at least one of its decisions which has been made public.
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ther the interests of a foreign power must be proved. It would be a
simple matter to incorporate these requirements expressly into the
text of any future Loyalty Order utilizing the same or similar standards.
Objection to this criterion on the ground of difficulty involved in prov-
ing knowledge and intent cannot seriously be entertained. The ob-
jection, if valid, would require the deletion from the books of a sub-
stantial number of statutes, both criminal and civil, which depend
almost entirely on a judicial inquiry into the motives and intent of
the parties. As one court recently phrased it, "such inquiry is laden
with uncertainties and fake paths." But the court did not for that
reason refuse to decide the issue or invalidate the statutes which created
the problem."4 Nor does an examination of the cases indicate that
judges have been unsuccessful in weighing the intent and motives of a
party when confronted with the necessity of so doing."6
With regard to the provision relating to affiliation with subversive
organizations, it would appear advisable to elaborate further the mean-
ing of "sympathetic association" as designed to include such degree
of conscious approval or support of the subversive aims of the organi-
zation falling short of membership or affiliation as to justify the im-
putation of the character of the organization to the individual involved
-approval or support which is to be shown not by friendship or blood
relationship with its members or by irregular attendance at meetings,
but rather by activities, such as the contribution of money or solicita-
tion of members, which may indicate support of its policies.
With these changes there is no doubt that the program can with-
stand any attack directed against it on grounds of its failure to ap-
prise the individual or the guilt determining bodies of the type of con-
duct sought to be proscribed.
Procedural Problems. Most acute of all the criticism of the Loyalty
Program has been that directed at its failure to accord certain proce-
dural safeguards to the Government employees and to organizations
declared to be subversive by the Attorney General." This criticism,
made almost unanimously, does not proceed solely on a premise of un-
See report of the Board's decision in the case of William Remington, N.Y. Times, Feb,
11, 1949, p. 1, col. 7, when the Board reversed a finding of disloyalty although Reining-
ton admitted having transmitted information to Miss Bentley. This would seem to
be further borne out by the Board's statement that evidence based on membership or
affiliation with subversive organizations can be fairly evaluated only after determining,
inter alia, whether the employee in question was aware of the subversive nature of the
organization. See note 52 supra.
54. Martel Mills v. NLRB, 114 F2d 24 (9th Cir. 1940).
55. See cases cited note 36 .supra.
56. Letter of Dean Griswold and Professors Scott, Katz and Chafee of the Harvard
Law School to the N.Y. Times, April 13, 1947, IV, p. 8, col. 5; Note, 47 Col'. L. Rv.
1161, 1175-7 (1947) ; Emerson & Helfeld, mrpra note 3, at 95-120; Cushman, The Presi-
dent's Loyalty Purge, 36 Suavrv GRAP Ic 283 (1947).
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constitutionality but appears to be motivated primarily by considera-
tions of fair play. In essence the major defects which have given rise
to criticism are, first, that an employee is not sufficiently apprised of
the charges against him prior to hearing; and second, that during the
hearing his opportunity to defend himself is curtailed because of the
policy of the hearing bodies against requiring disclosure to the em-
ployee of the source of information on which some of the charges are
based.
The truth of the first alleged defect is difficult to substantiate. On
the one hand, the press has frequently reported complaints of employees
that information contained in charges served on them prior to hearing
has been inadequate.57 On the other hand, the authors have received
a sample copy of what is said to be a typical charge served on an em-
ployee which would indicate that in fact the employee receives sub-
stantial notice of the evidence underlying the charge which he will be
expected to meet at the hearing."5
57. A recent example of this arose in the case of Samuel L. Wahrhafti-, AMG offi-
cial, ordered to return from Germany in connection with charges made against him on ac-
count of disloyalty. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Jan. 11, 1949, p. 1, col. 4; see also the case of
Dorothy Bailey reported in the Washington (D.C.) Sunday Star, March 27, 1949, p. A4.
58. In the Directives issued by the Loyalty Review Board to the regional hearing
bodies, it is provided that the employee shall be notified of "the charges against him in
factual detail, setting forth with particularity the facts and circumstances relating to
the charges so far as security considerations will permit." A sample copy of charges
served on an employee pursuant to this Directive is reproduced below:
1. There was established by Executive Order 9835, dated March 21, 1947, a Federal
Employees Loyalty Program, the purposes of which are to protect the United
States against the presence of disloyal persons in the Federal Service, and to
protect loyal employees of the Government from unfounded accusations of dis-
loyalty.
2. As a result of recent investigation conducted pursuant to the aforementioned
Executive Order 9835, there has been received information which indicates that
reasonable grounds may exist for the belief that you are disloyal to the Govern-
ment of the United States and therefore unsuitable for Federal employment.
3. It is charged that you have manifested disloyalty to the United States in that:
A. You have been a member of certain organizations of kmown subversive char-
acter.
1. You have been a member of the Communist Party, U.S.,A
2. You have been a member of (name or names of any other Communist or-
ganization or fronts).
B. You have been closely associated with persons kmown or reputed to be Com-
munists, under such circumstances as to justify an inference that you are
sympathetic to communistic viewpoints and objectives.
1. You have been closely associated with (name of individual) over a period
of years, socially as well as in connection with the duties of your employ-
ment.
2. You have met and associated with various other Communists, including
(name of individual), in connection with your membership in the Com-
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The second alleged defect in present procedures relates primarily to
the practice of the FBI with regard to non-disclosure of its sources
of information and the willingness of the Loyalty Review Board to
admit evidence of this nature. The Loyalty Review Board has in-
dicated its awareness of the importance and meritorious nature of this
criticism, but has concluded that the considerations in favor of pro-
tecting the investigatory tasks of the FBI against undue restriction
outweigh the disadvantages flowing to the individual employees. 5
While the Board's conclusion on the importance of protecting the
investigatory work of the FBI appears justified, it does not follow that
munist Party, U.S.A., and (name or names of other Communist organiza-
tions or fronts).
C. You have manifested sympathy with Communist doctrine and a desire to in-
fluence others toward its acceptance by your conduct, including service as a
Communist Party canvasser, assigned to the (name and 'location of election
district and election year or years).
4. You have ten calendar days from the date of your receipt of this notice to exer-
cise your right:
a. To reply to the foregoing charges in writing under oath or affirmatilon, which
oath or affirmation must be executed before a person duly authorized to ad-
minister oaths, and to support your answers by affidavits if you wish; and/or
b. Request an administrative hearing on the chareges before the (name of Govern-
ment Agency Loyalty Board). At such hearing you may appear personally
before the Loyalty Board, be represented by a counsel or other person of your
own choosing, produce witnesses and present evidence in your behalf. If you
desire but for any reason are unable to obtain a representative, you may request
the Loyalty Board or any responsible (name of Government Agency) official(s)
to assist you in securing such representative.
5. No decision has been made as to whether or not the above stated charges are
true as presented, and no such decision will be made until after consideration of
your reply, if a reply is submitted, and consideration of the evidence developed at
a hearing, if a hearing is held.
6. The proposed removal action will not become effective in less than 30 calendar
days from the date of your receipt of this notice. During this period of advance
notice you will be carried in an active duty status. (In some cases where
necessary the employee is placed immediately on inactive duty status pending
hearing and until decision).
7. This action is taken under authority of Section 9A of the Hatch Act (18 U.S.C.
61i), The Supplemental Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1949 (Public Law
862, 80th Congress), Executive Order 9835, approved March 21, 1947, and the
regulations and directives duly promulgated by and under the authority of the
U.S. Civil Service Commission Loyalty Board, in accordance with the provisions
of Executive Order 9835 as set forth in Title 5, Chapter II, Code of Federal
Regulations, 13 FR 253, and (Technical Bulletin of Government Agency).
8. Upon request, you may at any stage in the adjudication of your case, examine a
copy of (Technical Bulletin of Government Agency), Executive Order 9835, and
such directives and regulations of the U.S. Civil Service Commission Loyalty
Review Board as may have been made available to the (name of Government
Agency).
59. Statement of Seth Richardson, Chairman of Loyalty Review Board, Dec. 23,
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a Government employee inust therefore be denied opportunity to be
informed of the source of the evidence upon which the charges against
him are based.
Certainly in practice much more could be disclosed to the employees
than is currently disclosed. There seems no reason why the anonymous
informant who is not in the regular employ of the FBI and whose
testimony is relied on by the Board should not be revealed to the em-
ployee. It seems reasonable also that the Board should have the right
to subpoena these informants. If non-confidential informants do not
want to stand up and be counted, then their information should be
used only as possible leads and not be made the basis of a record which
cannot be refuted. And where it is impossible to reveal to the employee
the source of the evidence against him, as in the case of confidential
informants, the employee should at least be fully apprised of the con-
tents of the testimony.
Many of those identified with the loyalty test express the opinion
that information obtained from an anonymous informant has been
given little weight by those responsible for decisions.P At best it was
used only as a lead or in confirmation of information already obtained
from independent sources. This practice should be expressly required
so that it is uniformly followed by all hearing boards.
It sometimes happens that the employee may admit the truth of
statements made by the anonymous informers. All of this is to the
good. But the basic requirement should be insisted upon-namely
that in every hearing proceeding detailed "findings of fact" should be
drawn up to insure a proper basis for appeal.
The presence in the departmental files of the undigested and ambig-
uous yet very critical summaries of personnel under investigation can
do a great deal of harm. In the case of the initial hiring of employees,
very often the existence of such reports may frighten the perzonnel
officer into rejecting the applicant out of hand-or may prevent him
from further pursuing his search. In any case this is not the fault of the
investigating agency. The responsibility lies with the appointing
agency. But to the applicant it makes no difference where the blame
lies. He is the one who gets hurt.
There would appear to be no practical remedy 11 for this defect ex-
1947. In its Directives issued for the guidance of Local Agency Boards, the Loyalty
Review Board has provided that "the fact that the applicant or employee may have been
handicapped in his defense by the non-disclosure to him of confidential information or
by the lack of opportunity to cross ex-amine persons constituting such sources of informa-
tion shall be taken into consideration by the initial hearing body." Lo-alty Review
Board, Directive III.
60. Statements made to the senior author. See also note 59 supra.
61. One alternative, of course, would be to require that the FBI make its files and the
names of its informants available to the public. This would appear to constitute an
extreme solution which would unduly hamper the work of the FBI without sufficient
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cept to have men of character as well as judgment in charge of per-
sonnel who could exercise discretion and fairness in the handling of
these files.
Finally, two further amendments to existing procedures appear de-
sirable. First, more discretion should be given to agency officials
charged with evaluating the investigative reports to determine whether
complaints should be further processed. Under the existing system,
many cases of no substance reach the Loyalty Board which must then
take on the first responsible job of eliminating unwarranted com-
plaints. Doing this at an earlier stage would alleviate the burden of
work placed on the Loyalty Boards and relieve the employee from the
harrassment of a protracted Loyalty hearing. Similarly, at the hearing
stage the agency board should assume a greater responsibility in asking
the questions and in directing the course of the hearing. It should not
rely on the investigatory officials to carry this burden. The inferences
and significance of the employee's activities should be brought out by
those whose special competence lies in the field of analysis rather than
detection.
If this Loyalty Program needs doing-it should be done well. Com-
plaint is made by certain of these agencies that the standards set up by
the Civil Service Commission which must be, followed in adjudication
in cases under Executive Order 9835 make operation complex, because
appropriations for investigative staffs in sensitive agencies have been
reduced as a result of increased appropriations to the FBI and the
Civil Service Commission under the Loyalty Program. It is obvious
that this program cannot be made effective by the agencies concerned
unless they have the funds to follow the leads of the FBI and the means
to evaluate their findings. Just as sufficient funds should be appro-
priated for investigative purposes so the legislature should by appro-
priations make possible a proper job of evaluation. That is the vital
end product of investigation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In so far as all Government employees now in office have been ex-
amined, the Loyalty Program is completed. The present problem is
essentially one of dealing with new applicants.
In appraising the effect of this program neither those who oppose it
nor those who support it have given sufficient weight either to the
compensating advantage. For a discussion of the legal issues involved in the problem
of disclosure in a judicial proceeding, see Note, Government Privilege Against Dis.
closure of Offlcial Documents, 58 YALE L. J. 993 (1949).
An alternate remedy is suggested by a recent Congressional Resolution, proposing
that any person who believes that testimony or other evidence before a Congressional
committee tends adversely to affect his reputation shall have the right to include a sworn
statement to that effect in the record. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1949, p. 1, col. 7.
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effect the Loyalty Order had (1) in heading off more drastic measures
or (2) in weeding out in advance actual or potential disloyal employees.
But in hiring new employees the basic question remains: "Is there
a common sense course of action that will enable us to save our Govern-
ment from being too strong for the liberties of its own people or too
weak to maintain its own existence?" What is the best method of
procuring for Government service loyal, competent, responsible, free
and fresh-minded civil servants? Assuming that, under the present
program with the qualifications and corrections already noted, there
is no violation of constitutional guarantees, the question still remains:
"Is this an effective method of ascertaining disloyalty?"
In evaluating this problem, the present distinction between loyalty
and security tests in agencies subject to the Presidential Order of
March 21, 1947 and in so-called sensitive agencies is of little assistance.
Under the President's Executive Order, loyalty clearance refers to the
requirements placed upon all Government employees. Security clear-
ance refers to the special requirements of certain "sensitive security
areas" and applies to persons who work with classified or restricted in-
formation. This artificial distinction between loyalty and security
results in confusion. The two should be considered together.
Experience teaches us that a future war will not be fought in terms
of the last war. New forms of aggression are accompanied by new
weapons both open and secret, as part of a total war. We are learning
each day that we do not need to be engaged in a shooting war to suffer
losses in terms of prestige, or influence, or policy, or even of loyalty.
Exploitation of national weakness by a skillful and ruthless enemy can
result in dissension and disorder. Physical weapons are not the sole
means of breaking the will of a man to resist. The same result will
follow from the undermining of his mental and spiritual defenses. All
these things are aspects of a total war.
We can prepare against this only by an assessment of a man's total
personality. This is a problem for personnel management, which
is as necessary an art in public office as in private business.,2 It is es-
sential that procurement and security work together. The assessment
must be made not only to ascertain a man's elements of weakness but
to aid him in strengthening his powers of resistance, i.e., making him
aware of the methods and devices of those who would seek to divert
him.
To determine whether or not an individual is likely to commit dis-
loyal acts, either willingly and deliberately or under pressure from
enemy agents, it is not sufficient to ask him "Are you or have you been
62. An excellent survey of the entire field of government personnel can be found in
WHIV E, INTroDUcrio TO THE SrUDo or PuBnC AxmxraTRxo., (194); see also,
MERRaA, PUBLc PERSONNEL PROBLE.MS (193); and Levitan, The Responsiility of
Administrative Officials in a Dcvwcratic Society, 61 PoL. ScL Q. 562 (1946).
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a member of the Communist Party?" Nor can it be determined by his
willingness or unwillingness to take a loyalty oath.
These are subjective matters that cannot be reached by inquisi-
tional methods. A man may be subject to certain tensions which he
is able to resist, yet yield to pressures which he might not expect
would ever be applied. A man may work specifically to overthrow the
American System because he is a confirmed Marxist, or he may be a
conformist to our system of government yet reveal secret information
because he cannot resist bribes, or because he is temperamentally
unreliable and incapable of keeping a secret.
A person may be indiscreet, careless, a dupe, or emotionally and
ideologically confused. An individual may be an habitual drunkard
and therefore a poor security risk. He may be politically opposed to
Communism, and yet, because he has a close relative in the Soviet
Union or in a Soviet controlled country, be under pressure and there-
fore potentially insecure.
These examples of security dangers indicate that to determine the
kind and degree of actual or potential disloyalty, if any, in an individ-
ual it is necessary to discover what dispositions or motives he has
which might induce him to commit a disloyal act, as wel as to dis-
cover what abiding dispositions or motives he has which would pre-
vent him from doing such a thing.1
3
The essential problem resolves itself into one of finding a method to
be applied in conjunction with regular security investigations which
would disclose the basic personality structure, motivations and gen-
eral security fitness of a government employee before hiring him.
A basis for such enquiry is the experience of the Assessment School
of OSS during World War II. These experiences in reaching the com-
ponent parts of a man's personality are recited in a book called Assess-
ment of Men, written and published by a distinguished group of schol-
ars, scientists and professional men under the direction of Dr. Harry
Murray, Harvard Medical School. This group was charged with de-
veloping a system of procedures which would reveal the personalities
of OSS recruits to the extent of providing ground for sufficiently re-
liable predictions of their usefulness to the organization." The OSS
63. Typical of the complexities involved in the problem is the case of Julian Wadleigh,
former State Department employee and admitted thief of government documents, who
wrote that his original decision to deliver documents to the Soviet government through
the medium of the Communist Party was motivated primarily by his concept of "world"
loyalty, his desire to fight fascism even if it meant spying on his own country. See series
of articles in N.Y. Evening Post, July, 1949. See also WasT, Tnn MEANiNa OF TUASon
(1947); Samuels, American Traitors: A Study in Motives, N.Y. Times Magazine, May
22, 1949, p. 17.
64. The extensive "assessment" program initiated during the war by the Office of
Strategic Services was designed to screen overseas personnel in terms of their potential
aptitude, including physical, mental and emotional, for the tasks to which they would be as-
signed.
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Assessment School represents the first attempt to apply this type of
personnel procedure in measuring the qualification of those in govern-
ment service.
In the present situation the President might appoint a Commission to
review the Loyalty Program and to examine into the feasibility of
employing similar techniques in the screening of Government em-
ployees. The personnel of such a Commission should be selected with
a view to their special competence to examine into the social, cultural
and emotional bases underlying an individual's allegiance to his country
and the pressures and tensions which affect that allegiance.61
The Commission could be asked to consider, among others, the
following questions:
A. Are there existing G1 or projected 17 techniques, which, in con-
Although many of the tests devised by the Assessment Staff would not be feasible or
appropriate for the problem at hand, nevertheless the experiment is of significance as
the first serious attempt to utilize the services of psychiatrists and psychologists in pre-
dicting behavior and capabilities in government service. For a description of this e.--
periment see ASSESSMENT STAFF, THE ASSESSMENT OF MrN (1948).
65. In a related field, the suggestion has been made for the establishment of a
National Personnel Assessment Board for the selection and supervision of comptent
experts in the description of democratic and anti-democratic personalities v.ith the even-
tual purpose of devising tests or investigations for individuals seeking public office in
order to select leaders from among the "non-destructive genuinely democratic characters."
LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONArrv 187 (1948). The conclusions and recommendations
of Professor Lasswell would seem to lend support to the belief in the practical feasibility
of devising tests for the determination of such variable and intangible elements in the
human personality as are involved in the loyalty problem.
Suggestive of the possibilities and potentialities of studies which might be made in
the loyalty field is the work of the Foreign Morale Analysis Division of the Office of
War Information, which made a study of Japanese wartime morale in an effort to de-
termine its weaknesses and susceptibility to deterioration. For a description of this
work and the technique employed, see Leighton & Opler, Psychiatry and AppU!icd Aln-
thropology in Psychological Ularfare Against Japan, read before the Association for the
Advancement of Psychoanalysis at the New York Academy of Medicine, May 22, 1946
(mimeographed).
66. At present the Civil Service examines applicants primarily in terms of their
capabilities for the particular post applied for. A general intelligence test, mechanical
intelligence test, and a so-called unit test (designed to isolate mental traits) are ad-
ministered and in addition a personal interview and investigation of references is carried
out. Although other tests have been designed for the testing of social intelligence and
personality, these are not utilized by the Commission. Wnir, op. cit. sipra note 62, at
356-61.
67. For example, one of the tests currently employed to determine whether an em-
ployee may be disloyal is whether he has followed the Communist Party line through one or
more shifts. Obviously, this is a useful although essentially crude technique in the absence
of precise information, first, with regard to the infinite variety of party lines adopted
from time to time by the Communist Party and other "subversive groups"; and second,
with regard to a proper analysis technique of the beliefs of the individual employee.
Professor Harold D. Lasswell has made some interesting experiments in the field
of content analysis which seek to formulate on a scientific basis techniques for analyzing
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junction with the Civil Service intelligence tests now employed, could
be used in the testing of an individual's total personality-its creative
imagination, its balance, its motivation?
B. WAould it be feasible and advisable to apply these tests to every
employee coming into Government service and also on each occasion
when the employee is considered for promotion? 11
C. Is it possible to obtain a sufficient number of trained and skilled
professional men and women qualified as assessors in such a program?
D. Should such an assessment of applicants be made by an overall
Assessment Board or should assessment be decentralized so that each
agency would have its own board? 69
E. Should these boards be given the power of selection or should
propaganda. His tests were utilized by the Government in its prosecution of William
Dudley Pelley in order to show the consistency of Pelley's writings with the Axis line.
United States v. Pelley, 132 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943).
For summary of this type of work, see SmiTH, LASSWz.LL & CASEY, PROPAGANDA, COM-
MUNICATION AND PUBLIC OPINIoN 74 et seq. (1946).
The relevancy of this technique for analyzing reports and memoranda submitted
by applicants as evidence of their capabilities or prepared by government employees in the
course of their work is obvious. Yet clearlylunless a Commission such as the one
recommended in the text is established, endowed with sufficient funds and trained person-
nel, the utility and utilization of such techniques would be beyond the powers and skill
of existing investigatory and adjudicatory bodies responsible for the Loyalty Program
under the existing framework.
68. A basis for such reassessment is found in the civil service practice of making
out efficieny ratings periodically on all its employees.
Existing rating techniques for promotion and other purposes have gone through
several developments and modifications.
After considerable experimentation, the Civil Service discontinued in 1935 the uge
of the Graphic Rating Scale test which involved the scoring of the employee on fifteen
specific traits or qualities. Today it employs a simplified Service Rating Form which
requires the Supervisor to rate the employee in terms of his quality of performance
(dependability and skill), his productiveness (amount of work done, promptness, etc.)
and the -qualifications displayed (knowledge of duties, ability to learn from experience,
initiative and cooperativeness). In 1948, the Probst Rating Form was introduced ex-
perimentally in a few agencies. This form contains a detailed list of qualifications on
which the employee is to be rated including such characteristics as indifference, cranki-
ness, teamwork, self-confidence, etc. For discussion of these rating techniques, see
WHrrs, op. cit. supra note 62, at 417 et seq. The forms mentioned above are reproduced
respectively at pp. 412, 415 and 417. For analysis of rating techniques used by the Army
Air Forces during the war, see Guilford, The Discovery of Aptitude and Achievement
Variables, 106 SCIENCE 279-82 (1947).
69. Since 1938, departmental personnel officers have been established in the majority
of the federal agencies. The Civil Service Commission extends to them every facility
for advice and cooperation. Thus, the feasibility of establishing agency assessment boards
would not constitute any innovation. The success of this practice has been attested to on
every hand. WHITE, op. cit. .rpra note 62, at 331; and see recommendations for
strengthening of this system by the recent Hoover Commission, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11,
1949, p. 1, col. 4.
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their analysis and report be merely advisory to the agency head who
is vested with the final power of appointment?
If such an assessment program were found to be feasible, it would
constitute a major advance in the development of a sccurity program
capable of coping effectively and constructively with the type of threats
posed by the aggressive tactics of the Soviet Union and members and
sympathizers of the Communist Party.
While the procurement of loyal and intelligent civil servants con-
stitutes a major consideration in countering Communist infiltration
tactics in government service it must be recognized that no single
formula can provide a complete answer to the prevention of sub-
versive infiltration. We must face up to the fact that counter espion-
age must be used as a measure of protection.
Where actual violations of security occur on the part of Govern-
ment employees, the accused would be accorded a full hearing with
right of counsel and all other constitutional safeguards as discussed
above with reference to current Loyalty hearing proceedings.
Any program designed to strengthen the calibre of our civil serxice
and capable of meeting the threats posed by Communist infiltration in
Government service must recognize the dual problem of procurement
and security. It must embrace techniques adaptable to the special
necessities of each. The techniques indicated above are not neces-
sarily exclusive. Nevertheless, they are suggestive of a type of scien-
tific, non-political approach to the problem, which should relieve the
Government and the employee of many of the difficulties which have
arisen under the present Loyalty Program.
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